Comments on ‘Concentrated Credit Risk, Directed Lending, and Speculative Activity: Some Clarifications’
I commend your true enthusiasm!
Thank you for your update; Though I disagree with few points on your new post, but I think it's on right track, since it's concentrating on risk management, rather than the amount of debt; In your previous note, your final conclusion was: "...but unless a bailout by IMF or World Bank does not happen, it is very difficult to maintain a positive outlook about the Iranian economy." Which means there is a huge outstanding debt going to meltdown, which I strongly disagreed, and I think was very misleading. We should discuss more about risk free interest rate in Iran, and why it's not as high as it seems(which I think is because of inefficient intermediaries). But I think you should update your definition of Moral Hazard: The definition you provided is for a very narrow case of insurance. Moral hazard comes from "Hidden Action" in any Principal-Agent relations, and... [more at the permalink of the entry above]
Thanks Borghan for pointing that out. I have updated the entry with your note about the definition of moral hazard...but I couldn't ask my professors; it's so cold outside that I don't dare walk outside the house. It was -30 with the wind chill earlier ;-)
Thanks for your interesting analysis of Credit and risk in iranian Economy, Ali and Borghan. It is nice to see finally some iranian students study important subjects other than Science and Math.