There is a very good point about the current period, which makes it almost unique in the history of Iran. Before, almost always there was some sort of extraordinary charismatic leader. This leader is absent now and it seems to me no one can make such a thing again. That is a big deal, although no one seems to appreciate it. This fact can start a new reform movement empowered by the conservatives, not necessarily like the present one.

We have had many bifurcations after the revolution in 1979. First, splinting of pro- and anti-revolution groups and then, that of religious and nationalists, followed by more religious and national-religious separations and the last major one, the left and the right wings who are now considered as reformists and conservatives. I think we are going to have yet another one very soon, which might not be the last one.

As the majority of the members of the parliament are chosen from conservatives in the recent election, the new parliament's inauguraion will be the start of a real challenge for conservatives. The time to partition loots. Anybody wants more than what he has been given. And since there is not any strong leaders among them, they cannot stay united and they will start a competition. They will split into two parties and compete with each other. Sooner or latter, one of them will try to use public opinion as a weapon to dominate the opponent, while the other will try to stay in a safe place. This competition can be an engine for further reforms. If the competition doesn't help to any reforms, at least it will weaken both players and make some space available for others to play. Exactly like khatami's first election, when, another bifurcation was going to happen. The splinting of technocrat from conservatives. However it was not a complete one, it gave the opportunity to reformists to enter the game with the idea of reforms.

When I was growing up, I wore a school uniform which dictated the following rules on jewellery: in addition to our official school pins, we were allowed to wear a small gold chain with a cross on it; pearl or gold earring studs or small gold hoops, a wrist watch, and a medic alert bracelet. On the issue of make up, we were not allowed to wear any and the school administrator kept a bottle of nail polish remover for those girls who didn't have time to remove it before Monday morning. Any reader who has worn a school uniform is probably already thinking up ways to defy all these regulations. What my friends and I did was to grow our right pinky finger nails and wear bright blood red nail polish on it. As our teachers moved around the room over bent heads scribbling the latest notes our red fingers were duly tucked in holding on to our regulation pens. Hidden from the view of authority we had a sisterhood of defiance and freedom to wear a little nail polish regardless. To this day, you can often find me wearing nail polish on no more than my pinkies.

I was reminded of this life, and symbols of resistance to the regulations imposed on youth by their schools, when France debated and passed a law restricting the wearing of religious symbolism or clothing in their public school system. I was reminded that the more one restricts teenagers, the more some of them will find ways to circumvent the law and to assert their right to be different. But I was also reminded that in a public school system in a secular state, the support or proliferation of religion is not sanctioned. What, I wondered briefly on my own blog, would my political stance on this issue be?

Loathe to impose too many regulations on the young, I nevertheless come away cynically wondering why France does not make their regulations less offensive by imposing a full school uniform on their public schools? It is not unusual in many states for all school children to wear uniforms thus making them equal in the classroom. But then my mind wandered to Malaysia, a country of 60% Muslims, and remembered the many variations of those school uniforms – the one for Muslim girls, the one for non-Muslim girls, the ones for boys... In Malaysia the school children were dressed in regulation uniforms but their religious beliefs were still at the heart of the shape of that dress.

So what is the problem, or is there one, with the decision in France? The problem, as I see it, is as subtle and complex as any human rights issue ever is. The issue is general and personal; political and cultural. It is about how states govern school curriculum and community and how what we teach in schools, both implicitly and explicitly, shapes our political beliefs.

But on a global level, the UN Declaration on Human Rights affords each of us the global right to practice our religions freely. And if that religious practice dictates the wearing of special clothing, then should schools not allow for a special uniform – whether that uniform alteration be the addition of hijab, cross, yamoulke, turban, or other symbolism. The learners, after all, are not teachers and are not converting others by their choice in clothing. I am reminded of studying Arabic at the American University in Cairo and the vast array of political opinions expressed through our teachers' individual choices in clothing – conservative Western dress to conservative Muslim dress. We were subtlety exposed to the full array of opinions, but never once did a teacher try to impress Islam upon us, a group made up largely of un-believers. Perhaps then, it is not just students who can, if they so choose, wear clothing with a religious purpose and remain undaunting in their teaching of a set curriculum? Perhaps even teachers can wear these garments and remain neutral in their treatment of their learners?

I had a second, specific, problem with the media’s focus on hijab. Afterall, the decision in France affects students of all religious persuasions, so why did the international media make the Muslim women seem to be the only ones who had something to lose? But the heart of my problem was not political; rather it was personal. Is the hijab always a religious symbol of Islam? And perhaps my question is rooted in my own position, as a non-Muslim woman who has been adopted into Middle Eastern and non-Middle Eastern Muslim nations, as a woman who wears hijab and misses it when it is not there. (Yes, that really is me swathed in the orange burqa in the picture.)

In my early years as student of the Middle East, I dutifully listened to and parroted the Western feminist opinion of the hijab, mentally equating it to my experiences with a strictly enforced school uniform. I swore that while I was willing to accept all sorts of aspects of Muslim culture, I would never adopt the head scarf … that symbol of women's "oppression". After many years of direct contact with Muslims, my views considerably altered as I came to know the individuals behind the symbols.

Eventually, I found myself in Pakistan, a country where a mere 10% of the population is non-Muslim. I was profoundly aware that even non-Muslim women, especially the uneducated, wore a distinctly South Asian version of the hijab as part of their everyday dress. And I wondered… can the hijab be more than a religious symbol? Within a year I was offered a managerial position to work in the most conservative part of Pakistan with the Afghan refugee population. In the interview I was asked point blank if I would be willing to "dress like a local". I already wore the Pakistani shalwar kamis, so why not add Afghan chadori, and even burqa, if it meant I could gain acceptance and access to the community? Within a month of my accepting that position, I was out there with the best of them covering my face to the eyes to hide the gaze of men, averting my eyes, and wearing chadori for trips to rural areas. Within a short period of time women and men were taking me into their confidence and I felt that I was truly a part of their community and lives. To be honest, my chadori keeps me warm in the winter and keeps the sun off me in the summer. Frankly, what could be better than that?

In 2001 and 2002, I donned a burqa at anti-war protests and carried a sign which said, "I have the right to live in peace, too." The hijab, I have learned, is my friend much more so than my enemy. It protects me from the evil of surveillance – by officials, by the unwanted gaze of strangers, by anyone I chose to remain anonymous from. It is not a symbol of my religion, but a symbol of my strength, of my politics, and of my desire to protect my privacy in the public sphere.

On this level, I can understand the outrage of French women who wear hijab. But on the other hand, I remain torn and believe that the place of religion in the public schools of secular states is to be minimised. Like French society and other secular states, I struggle everyday with the same question of how to reconcile the roles of organised religion in the public and the private spheres. The answers are not yet in clear view, but they are getting there. And in that light, I can now say that if I were a French parliamentarian, I would most likely have voted against the resolution. But who knows? Tomorrow I may change my mind.

Disaster struck Iran again. On Wednesday, a cargo train loaded with fuel, fertilizers and other nasty chemicals went off tracks at a rail station near the city of Neyshabur leading to a giant explosion shortly afterwards. The official death toll runs around 320 with another 460 injured. The second saddest thing to the incident itself in every such disaster is the public apathy and complacency that follows.

There always seems to be a justification or some simple-minded reasoning that tends to deflect people's minds from scrutiny into the root cause of the incident and holding someone or some agency responsible. Earthquakes, of course, are a natural disaster—an "act of god." What can we do about nature? Planes crash because of US embargo—all those big aerospace companies that are denying us spare parts or new planes. It is totally out of our hands! But no one seriously asks who authorized those flimsy brick houses (tombs, better to call them) to sprawl in a proven earthquake-prone region or who cleared those ailing aircrafts to fly without proper maintenance? As if poor decision making or mismanagement never played any role in the loss of innocent life in these supposedly out-of-our-control disasters.

But this time it is a fatal train explosion that needs explanation. Lets think about it for a moment. A chain of wagons loaded with fuel and fertilizer—the same combustible recipe that blasted the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995 and took the lives of 168 people in the worst pre-911 act of terrorism in the American history—moving through a populated residential area in Iran, apparently without proper safety measures in place. Which "dark forces&" are to blame for this one? Even if those ill-fated firefighters (and bystanders) had been informed of the contents of the train soon enough, so many people would not be gathering around the wreckage after the initial derailment and the human toll would not have been so high. Who is really responsible for these senseless losses of life? Iran is posed to inaugurate its ambitious nuclear energy program within the next few years. Who is then going to take responsibility for the safe transport of radioactive material around the country?

Let me be clear on one thing: I am not a die-hard fan of western-style democratization of the developing world, nor I buy all those hooplas about how perfect the American democracy is. But if there is one good thing about democratic societies, it is their core concept of accountability. Meaning that people have the tools to freely scrutinize, disapprove, confront, challenge, hold responsible or impeach their public officials for the decisions that they make, especially when those decisions affect public safety and security. In that sense, it may not be an exaggeration to claim that today in Iran more ordinary people silently fall victim to the lack of democracy, than those who bluntly shout for it on the streets.

I am going to compile the list of reasons on why this election was rigged based on reports by news agencies as well as on what is written in weblogs. I am doing so because it seems some naïve international news agencies are reporting the big win of conservatives in Iran without clearly stating that this was a sham election.

Here is the list of violations:

1. Wide spread disqualification of well-known reformist candidates by the Guardian Council (GC). This disqualification included 80 members of current parliament. GC is a body with 12 members who are appointed by the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei.
2. There is no well-known opposition figure running in this election. They have already been disqualified by being executed, jailed or exiled.

3. The time for casting vote was extended by the Guardian Council from 6p.m. to 10p.m. on Friday. Based on the election law, extending the time is under jurisdiction of Interior Ministry, which was not happy with the extention.
4. Mohammad Reza Khatami, a reformist, accused hardliners of printing 2 millions Iranian national IDs in Pakistan. There is no way for me to verify his accusation. However, contarary to all the past elections, the Guardian Council announced that in this election picture ID is not required for casting a vote. This doesn't have any lawful justification since almost all IDs were replaced 9 years ago with photo IDs.
5. The Guardian Council announced that the eligible population is 43 million to increase the announced percentage of participants in the election, while Interior Ministry, which is in charge of organizing the election, said that there are 46 eligible voters.
6. There are reports that soldiers doing their two-year compulsory military service, have been told to take a day off but come back with a stamp in their national ID proving that they have voted.
7. Tehran municipal government interfered in the election by mobilizing all its facilities, such as billboards, to help the propaganda of getting people to vote.
8. A gossip was spread that youth who wouldn’t vote would not be permitted to enter in public universities. This gossip was denied by the government but nonetheless it influenced some to vote. Some people have still memories of 80s when people were barred from universities merely for not going to Friday prayers regularly.
9. The flow of information was disrupted. Two major reformist newspapers were shut down last week. There was a larger degree of filtering Internet in past week.
10. The seizure and closure of Mosharekat Party’s headquarter. Mosharekat is the biggest reformist party, which has vowed not to participate in election.

Please write any other violation you know in the comment section with reference or without.

When one week ago, despite Interior Minister's statistics of having 46 million eligible voters in Iran, Constitutional Guardian Council (CGC) claimed there are about 43 million eligible voters, most of political observers simply consider it just as another attempt by CGC to overestimate participation rate, which was considered to be lower than previous election by all activists. What was not so apparent by that time, was how crucial is this threshold.

After only few hours since the polls closed, though there is no official estimation, unofficial estimates show around 21 to 22 million votes have been cast. So now the question is (that) whether Islamic Republic is a legitimate Theocracy-Democracy with approval of 51% of Iranians, or it is illegitimate due to having less than 50% support by people, in contrast with the previous elections when usually 70% voted for parliamentary elections. The question will become more serious if one realizes that in all of the top 5 cities, including Tehran, participation rate is below or about 30%.

It is not very hard to imagine how from tomorrow, hard-core reformists, including Participation Front of Iran (PFI) who has the majority in the current parliament and most of its members were banned from election, will interpret the result of election as people's answer to their boycott, and conservative, who are going to gain majority in the next course of Parliament starting from next July, will consider the election legitimate and as a great victory for the regime, or as they call it: A Punch in the Enemy's Face!

And finally, centrist reformist, including reformist clergies like president Khatami and House speaker Karrobi, who were allowed to participated in election and despite their opposition to CGC asked people to vote, will interpret people’s low participation as a result of CGC exclusive policies; however, in contrast with hard-core reformists, they will consider the regime legitimate, since it has at least 50% approval, even on its worst days!

In the meantime, most of intellectuals, both religious and secular ones, who one way or another asked people to do not participate in election to avoid legitimacy of the regime, will have hard time digesting why their boycott did not work as they expected; that is why instead of, let’s say 30%, about 50% voted. Some may stick to conspiracy theories, accusing semi-mandatory votes by those lay people who thought not voting may cause civil consequences for them; and some may ask deeper questions like: why they cannot convey their message, illegitimacy of the regime, to the ordinary people?

But I still cannot see the connection between voting and legitimacy of the regime! I believe people should, and most of them do, vote whenever they have choices and their votes make a difference, regardless of whether the regime is acceptable and legitimate or not.

I think the question of legitimacy of a regime cannot, and should not, be answered unless the alternative system is defined and understood well. Therefore, though some speculations from this election can be made, no clear conclusions about the legitimacy of Iran's current regime can be drawn based on participation rate in the election.

What is clear, however, is: at least half of Iranians could not find any choice among candidates that makes any difference, that is to say, half of Iranians think no change could be done for Iran's next four years, a very sad news for Iranians' future.

Today was the day the people of Iran were supposed to elect their representatives in the Islamic Parliament. For reasons many of you may already know (e.g. see When MPs Find Their Balls and They Deserve It!), this might prove to be the most questionable election ever held in the history of the Islamic Republic.

For those of you who have not been following the news lately, here is a recap of what happened during the past few months.

Latest Update:
Feb. 23, 23:00 (Local Time); Fatemeh Haghighatjoo's resignation was accepted. She was one of the disqualfied "reformist" candidates.
According to the BBC radio (Farsi service), the Ministry Of Interior (MOI) has announced that the number of votes cast in some cities including Semirome (a small town in the province of Isfahan) is more than the total number of eligible voters! (I could not find any mention of this in the MOI website though.)

Feb 22, 18:45 (Local Time); According to the state-controlled radio, a total number of 294,151 ballots cast in 792 ballot boxes (close to 25% of the total number of boxes) have been counted in the Tehran district, which includes the capital city, and three other nearby towns. Ten candidates in this district are said to have already acquired enough votes to enter the parliament. This includes Haddad-Adel (the supreme leader's darling) , Tavakoli (also a two-time runner for presindential elections), and Amir Khadem (the former wrestling champion whose brother also managed to get into Tehran's city council due to the extremely low voter turn-out in those elections).
Karoubi's name is no longer among the top 30.


Feb 21, 22:28 (Local Time); Baztab, a Persian website said to be owned by Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the expediency council (headed by the former president Hashemi-Rafsanjani) claims that the total number of participants in the elections is estimated to be around 24.5 million.
Tehran's votes are still being counted, but the name of the front-runners have been released. Haddad-Adel, whose daughter is the supreme leader's daughter-in-law, the same guy who was practically shoved into the previous parliament by the Guradian Council, is now the top winner in Tehran. Karoubi is said to be hovering around the 30th position.


Feb 21, 12:00 (Local Time); According to the Iranian state-controlled radio, about 8.9 million votes have so far been counted. These are the votes of 114 electoral districts. Fourteen of these should hold a second round of elections. It is important to note that these numbers do not include votes cast in Tehran.

Feb 21, 09:55 (Local Time); According to the Islamic Rebulic News Agency (IRNA) the votes cast in 57 electoral districts have been counted. The candidates in 52 districts have acquired enough votes to enter the parliament. Four Five districts must hold a second round of elections. I was not able to find any official comments on what has happened to the remaining one district.
There was a mistake on IRNA's site. In their detailed list, there are five districts that should hold a second round.

Feb 21, 00:05 (Local Time); After extending the deadline twice, the voting was finally closed at 10PM Feb. 20. Counting has already started.

Disqualification

A few months ago, the Council of Guardians, composed of twelve non-elected members, disqualified more than 4,000 of the so-called reformist candidates, including the president's brother [who is the leader of the largest reformist party in the current parliament], barring them from running for the seventh Islamic parliament. Initially, the so-called reformists were (or at least pretended to be) dismissive of the importance of this move by the council, marking it as just another desperate measure taken by the hard-liners, trying to use it as a bargaining chip in the up-coming elections.

People's Apathy

Having given up on the so call "reform front," the public showed little interest on what was happening. One should only compare the reaction of the students with the 1999 student uprisings that were merely triggered by closing down of one single "reformist" newspaper to know that this time, the public could not care less about who will take the seats of the seventh parliament.

The all too late sit-in

Realizing that the election is just a few weeks away, and witnessing the public's lack of interest in their political fate, the "reformists" did what they should have done a couple of years ago. Many of the pro-reform parliamentarians seriously protested against the massive disqualifications in the form of a sit-in and fasting, probably hoping to trigger some public protests. The move was shrugged off by many people as too little and too late to deserve any public support. Some skeptics even dismissed the whole thing as being a lame charade played by the regime to stimulate people's interest in the upcoming elections and creating a high voter turn-out which could then be interpreted as the regime's popularity and legitimacy.

Resignation

As many could predict, the sit-in did nothing that could either stimulate people's interest or budge the hard-liners from their position. Feeling trapped in their own ridiculous sit-in, they could neither end the sit-in prematurely nor could they wait and waste valuable time while the hard-liners were already putting the champaign on ice for their victory celebrations, so to speak. Therefore, they decided to play the old card president Khatami once tried to play a couple of years ago and embarrassingly failed, i.e. resignation. For a few days resignation was the word of the day. Everyone in the so-called reformist camp, from the MP's in sit-in, to deputy ministers, to provincial governors threatened to resign. The interesting point to note was that the same people virtually did not breathe a word after the supreme leader told them to shut up when they were planning to change the press law.

While busy making empty threats of resignation, the "reformists" once again made what could be called their last mistake, namely, to leave the job of lobbying and bargaining to the most two ineffectual delegates: president Khatami, and the unsuspecting, ambivalent, double-crossing head of the parliament, Mehdi Karroubi. The two delegates approached the supreme leader on several occasions trying to beg mercy for their fellow reformers.

Finally, the leader did what he does best. He held a separate public meeting with each side of the conflict telling each one what they wanted to hear. He gave the Guardian Council a mild slap on the hand and at the same time a warm pat on the back, telling them to review the candidates' cases but urging them "not give in to any bullying". The guardian council qualified a small number of the disqualified, simply citing the reason for their qualification as "based on executive orders", and instead disqualifying a number of other people who had been qualified before.

The silence of the lambs

After the second round of disqualifications, the president said he will not allow for such unfair elections to be held on Feb. 20; the MP's said they would resign one by one (they couldn't do it all together because technically the resignation of an MP should be approved by the rest of the parliament members). Again as usual, this all was proven to be a whole bunch of hot air, as the supreme leader said the election date must not be deferred, and issued a religious decree that any resignation is banned. The justice department immediately issued a statement that it would prosecute and punish to the fullest extent anyone who breaks the law.

The so-called reformists were once again silenced. There was no resignation. In a ridiculous letter published in many newspapers, the president called on the people to participate in the elections despite having limited choices. Today, he took part in the elections himself and his picture was shown on all IRIB channels while he was casting his ballot.

Final shot in the dead corpse

As if it wasn't enough already, the infamous Saeed Mortazavi, the press court judge, ordered the shutdown of two more pro-reform newspapers on the eve of the elections on the charges that they alluded to a rather harsh letter written to the supreme leader by some of the disqualified MP's . Apparently the person who had issued a ban on publishing that letter was the secretary of the National Security Council, Hassan Rohani. It is interesting to note that the president, who happens to be the head of that council, has denied any knowledge of the ban prior to it being issued. The justice department has also closed down and sealed the headquarters of the Participation party (headed by the president's brother). Some websites, including that of the participation party are also reported to have been filtered in Iran.

The supreme recipe

Having gotten rid of the so-called reformists in the most vulgar way possible, there was only one more minor concern: the voter turn-out. In a public speech, the supreme leader said that since we have about 46 million eligible voters throughout the country, the "ever present people" should demonstrate a massive turn-out to bring the number of cast ballots to no less than 40 million. One official in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) was also quoted to have suggested that the Basiji's (the Islamic paramilitary vigilantes) should help bring the number to 50 million.

The new face of the "ever present people"

IRIB, the state controlled television, started a huge campaign days ago to portray not only the public's discontent with the current parliament, but also a massive vow of participation by the public, citing it as everyone's religious and national duty to vote. One notable difference in the way the "spontaneous" interviews were conducted this year, was that the majority of the interviewees looked quite different from the typical pro-regime individual. No beards, no dirty hear, no disgusting looks; mostly young men wearing jeans and following the latest teenage hairstyle in town!

Today, they constantly showed scenes of people lining up in very long queues just to cast their ballots. Almost all five channels were dedicated to covering the elections this morning. Even the people's favorite football narrator was on duty today to cover the elections and ask people why they have decided to vote; and the answer among other things was of course "to throw a big punch at America's face".

"And when you pour into my goblet the bitter drink of death, I'll kiss the goblet full of joy, dear, and drunken I shall die." Rumi

Well here is another one: "Nearly 300 people are now known to have died in Iran when a train carrying fuel and chemicals exploded." (BBC News, 19 Feb, 2004) It was just a week ago that we were once more on the headlines because of a disaster: "An Iranian plane has crashed near Sharjah airport in the United Arab Emirates, killing at least 43 people." (BBC News, 10 Feb, 2004) Not to mention less than two month ago, when we had the Bam earth quake: "Iranian officials say they now believe at least 41,000 people were killed in last month's devastating earthquake." (BBC News, 16 Jan, 2004)

Is it only me or has it occurred to you too, that Iranians, more than other nations, seem to die due to noisy incidents like earth quakes, plane crashes, train crashes, war, executions, the commercial airline being shot by Americans or the pilgrims being shot in Saudi Arabia! Some of these things do happen for other nations as well but it appears that even in those cases whenever they happen to us, the numbers exceed the normal standards.

I might be oversensitive and there definitely needs to be accurate statistics to make such claims, but somehow I think Iranian life has become very cheap. Last week I heard host Don Imus of MSNBC in the Morning show, responding to the news of Iranians killed in the airline crash, had remarked "When I hear stories like that, I think who cares," and afterwards he had only regretted the fact that they weren't Saudi Arabians. Leaving aside insensitivity of his remarks, deep inside I felt well at least literally, he has got a point, nobody really seems to care!

I mean, what do we really do about all these? We grieve and wait for another one to happen, don't we?

If we really cared about the life of each individual Iranian we would really start thinking of more effective ways to prevent such outcomes and by that I don't mean announcing three days of national mourning for each of them!

The Sufis are famous for their romantic poetry, some of which (that of Rumi, in particular) is famous even among Westerners who may never have heard the word "Sufi". The Western literary traditions of romanticism owe a great debt to the influence of Sufi romantic poetry, and particularly the practitioners of it who originated in Moorish Spain: the Troubadors.
Sufi love poetry can be beautiful when taken at face value -- as referencing the romantic bonds between human lovers, the worldly love of man and woman, the courtly love of a man for the Lady of the Manor, or simply the abstraction of Love as a personified force. But as with other Sufi materials, this romantic poetry functions on another level, reflecting the "creed of love" as Sufism is often described. Love is worship, and the Beloved is the Divine.

Rabia, who said "My Beloved is always with me", described the pain of separation from and the joy of reunion with the Divine in terms of separation from and longing for an absent lover - sometimes in rather direct terms:

"I pray God that you fall in love With someone as cold and indifferent as you are. Then you may understand The pain of love, the sufferings and tortures of separation, And you may appreciate my devotion."

In the early dawn of happiness
you gave me three kisses
so that I would wake up
to this moment of love

I tried to remember in my heart
what I'd dreamt about
during the night
before I became aware
of this moving
of life

I found my dreams
but the moon took me away
It lifted me up to the firmament
and suspended me there
I saw how my heart had fallen
on your path
singing a song

Between my love and my heart
things were happening which
slowly slowly
made me recall everything

You amuse me with your touch
although I can't see your hands.
You have kissed me with tenderness
although I haven't seen your lips
You are hidden from me.

But it is you who keeps me alive

Perhaps the time will come
when you will tire of kisses
I shall be happy
even for insults from you
I only ask that you
keep some attention on me.

There is more to Sufi love poetry than meets the eye...

Granting myself the luxury of succinctness, I would like to keep a simplistic dualism in the text that follows. When asked what kind of political ethics leads to democracy, we often tend to list such virtues as tolerance, respect of rights, non-violence, and so on, not knowing that these are nothing but the traits of a certain ontogeny of politics. Put simply, we have a tendency to see the ethics that informs the "democratic conduct" as the latter's conditions. What I suggest here briefly is that democratic or undemocratic conducts do not really stem from certain ethical principles; rather, such conducts and their ethical principles are nothing but expressions of two different ontological strands—each giving rise to one or the other political conduct. Let me call one the "politics of immanence"—that which makes undemocratic conduct possible—and the other the "politics of transcendence"—to whom democratic conduct owes its manifestation.

The politics of immanence is a politics of ultimate principles, in which the entire political edifice is (re-)instituted around a certain referential point—race, history, ethics or religion—that functions, in first glance, not only as the raison d'être of the existing regime, but also, more significantly, as the historical necessity for its emergence. The ultimate principles of such politics thus attain the status of uncontested knowledge to which the public subscribes en masse. But like any other principle claiming ultimacy, it is nothing but a phantasm—a mere assumption, an assertion, a claim—one which reigns supreme simply due to its success in excluding other, competing claims. Hence the monopoly of truth-claims gives this type of politics its "immanence": the principles upon which this politics is founded is never left out in the open where it can be contested. Rather, it is vehemently guarded with paranoia, lest contact with a foreign agent undermine its acclaimed purity. The Institution of an external "other" is first on the agenda of such politics. The resistance against a perceived "other" is the highest justification for the regime's policies. In the politics of immanence the borders are totally fixed, not only to guard the sovereign referent from the other outside, but more significantly, from the other inside.

The political regime thus edified creates the illusion of something "inside" that must not in any case be compromised. Sovereignty is achieved through the maximization of the perceived ultimate principles to most any area of social life. That is why politics of immanence cannot survive without the presence of an outside threat or a foreign agent—call it as you wish, no shortage of terms in this case—that apparently has sworn to undermine this phantasmic principle. How ironic that a regime based on a unique, immanent referent will cease to exist in the absence of a perceived threat from afar. The ultimacy of such principles now functions as the organizing truth by making a series of loose and unwarranted conceptual equations—and their identical social practices—with the supreme referent. Maximalist interpretations of the ultimate principles make these equations possible.

Intellectually, the principles of such political regimes can effortlessly be challenged (although in general not without considerable human cost). One simply needs to refuse the supreme referent and the regime will conceptually collapse. That explains why a regime of immanence has to be delivered with the forceps of a revolutionary fervour and needs to replace education, reflection, information and analysis with propaganda. The maximalized principle that governs this politics necessitates a majoritarian support based on the "legitimacy" of greater numbers. But whether the conceptual collapse of the regime, which can be delivered by any concerned and informed citizen, translates into social and political action—that indeed is a different question, although oftentimes such translation does take place.

The politics of transcendence should now be easy to sketch, since we can already tell what it is not. Such politics receives its principles from the treatment of an arrivant, a foreigner, lost stranger, the immigrant, or an "other." What is to be guarded is the process of receiving the arrivant, of recognizing the "other" as other, without trying to deny otherness. Thus the politics of transcendence is a politics that receives its legitimacy in the eyes of the outsider, here or there. The success of such politics is measured by the treatment of minorities, immigrants, the invisible, impoverished, injured and voiceless.

The politics of transcendence is based on the principle of inalienable rights. These rights require well-defined procedural thoroughfare accessible equally to both governing and governed. Thus the procedural legality of decisions remains highly at stake in such politics, lest a wrong turn undermine or reprimand the principle of transcendence—that is, the recognition of the "other"—upon which the entire political edifice based. Political life under such conditions necessitates the direct involvement of informed citizens, their continuous sobriety, unlearning discrimination and uncalled-for judgements, and finally, the neighborly treatment of each "other" and one another.

By way of concluding this note, alas, two caveats are in order. First, the two contrary principles of "immanence"—closure—and "transcendence"—openness—are not in actual cases mutually exclusive. Democratic or despotic societies retain both principles to varying degrees. That is why there is always the possibility that a despotic state may meet its own demise in the shadow of a rising democratic movement. It is, likewise, possible that a democratic state will degenerate into despotic reaction. Still, there are many cases in which democratic states advocate one or another despotic policy: just recently, a fanatical interpretation of secularism in France led to the enforced removal of religious apparel in arenas of public education (which in fact hides French nationalism—an ideology no less disturbing than any religious public manifestation).

This short reflection had the luxury of keeping them as neat binary terms—which is never the case. Secondly, the two types of politics, do originate in two seemingly opposing places. Contrary as they are, they have their origins in what is one and the same. For our deep concerns about the democratic impulse in Iran, these two caveats bear a message: that democracy cannot be simply achieved and institutionalized once and for all. Rather, it must be protected, cared for, deepened and radicalized. In the end, as often said, every people receive the kind of politics they deserve.

[The author of these lines wishes to apologize for the abstract nature of this article.]

Editor's Note: It is perhaps not quite possible to grasp the meaning of the keywords "immanence" and "transcendence" without taking a few courses in philosphy and theology, but in order to shed a light, however dim, on these concepts you may find useful to take a look at the following links:

- Immanence at the MYSTICA,
- Immanence from the Columbia Encyclopedia at encyclopedia.com, and
- Immanence from the Catholic Encyclopedia at New Advent.

They ruined the country, fair! But if somebody asks me to name one good thing Islamic Republic has done for us, I'll definitely go for post-revolution Iranian Cinema. You may laugh, I don't care. Keeping the Hollywood crap out of movie theatres for more than twenty years is indeed a great job. It's some time now, however, that crap copies of the original crap can be consumed by its Tehrani lovers practically the same day its Londoner lovers queue in West End cinemas to watch the premiere. Yet, one has to admit that the clerics have done their best and there has been nothing more they could do about the inevitable invasion of craps. With this great effort, unintentionally, they have served Iranian Filmmaking Industry!

Iran is a country with nearly all sorts of resource, be it human or natural. Yet, Iran is virtually a 'nation without production'—in global level I mean. It is better not to talk about industry or technology; in terms of arts and humanities, though, the only branch worth noting might be the moving image. It is true that even this cultural production can not find considerable audience across the globe, but at least, this is a case Iranians are not alone in. European productions are not able to get enough room even in their very own country of origin. So, finding enough Iranian movies to watch once a month (and I’m not saying that they are necessarily good movies), when you live in a western capital with absolutely no sign of your own country, is indeed a great achievement for Islamic Republic and its aspirations to export 'The Revolution.'

Officially, there are around sixty to seventy movies made in Iran each year. Of these, a considerable proportion is honestly not worth talking about. Specifically in recent years, with a bit of freedom to exploit male-female relations, more and more directors are joining the stream to make wishy-washy love stories. Another few movies, each year, are made about the Iran-Iraq war and the 'Eight Year Holy Defence.' Unfortunately, not only these fail to show the reality of war, but also their total sacrifice propaganda has left most of Iranians alienated. However, among these, one could find outstanding features such as Bahram Beyzayi’s Bashu (1989) which becomes more appreciable regarding the time it was made. Apart from recent love stories, the war movies, and very few comedies made in the years after the revolution, there remains two more group of films and filmmakers.

First, there are the so called 'social movies.' Among these, are some of the most interesting works on the grounds that they manage to show deficiencies or even to provide serious criticism without passing the –often too tight- red lines of the Islamic Republic. Rather old example can be 'Nargess' (1992) by Rakhshan Bani-etemad which amazingly illustrates a prostitute in Tehran without framing any human body except for the main actress' face. 'I am Taraneh, I am fifteen years old' (2002) by Rasul Sadr-Ameli is yet another newer example in which the teenage pregnancy and single parenthood is the main theme.

Second and maybe the most significant, at least in terms of overseas achievements, are the films directed by the so called Iranian 'artistic-makers' with their pioneer Abbas Kiarostami or the recently activist and ex-director Mohsen Makhmalbaf. They often have a more 'personal' cinema in which a momentary concern or a life-time ethics or phylosophical question might ultimately turn into a single-crew digitally made movie. This group of filmmakers had received almost every prestigious prize in every prestigious festival throughout the world. I have to mention, although I don't like her and I'm resisting the temptation... No it's not fair, I have to name her here. OK! Samira Makhamalbaf is the last phenomenon in this category who won her first international award as a teenager for 'The Apple' (2000) and pushed her way into major festivals' juries at the age of twenty. No need to say of course, no Iranian had still become honoured by the 'statue-goes-to… award.'

Definitely, by no means, to hell I swear, be sure, I admit wholeheartedly, please don't be misunderstood, would you please just let me finish, I'm not saying that winning the Palm d’Or is something to be proud of, yet, as I said before, for a nation without production, these achievements had been unique in every possible way. And in this, I say, we should be for once grateful of the revolution which unconsciously preserved for us something to be named the 'National Cinema'. How we like or dislike this cinema is yet another story.

P.S. You can check for more info on any of the movies mentioned above in the Internet Movie DataBase.

A few weeks ago, Mahmoud Shamsolvaezin, a reformist journalist, was in Toronto and gave a speech about parliamentary election in Iran. There was one sentence in his talk which I liked the most. He said: "Iranians are very patient to endure the long-term dictatorship however they are very impatient whenever there is any hope." In my opinion, what has happened during the last month in Iran is the best proof for this claim.

More than one hundred MPs started a sit-in in protest to the mass disqualification of the candidates by the Guardian Council a month ago. The sit-in lasted for 26 days and ended differently than what many people thought at the beginning. The MPs did not compromise on their demands with the conservatives. They finally resigned and are still standing on their promises. Sadly, people are not supporting them.

People may have a few reasons for their reluctance. They think that reformists should have stood against the conservatives much earlier, when Ayatollah Khamenei rejected the press bill. In people's view, the reformists' action is very late as well as dishonest. The MPs didn't do anything till their own fate fell into danger. On the other hand, people are disappointed by observing no real changes after the reformists came into the power. They now prefer to take care of their everyday life believing that engaging in the politics of their own country has turned out to be useless.

Whatever the reasons for people's reluctance are and whoever's fault is, this will only help the conservatives to come into the power and rule the country by their backward agenda. This is a sad fact that people simply ignore paying attention to it. Their action (inaction!) is based on several wrong assumptions which have lead to this miserable situation.

I have real problem understanding the concept of "disappointment" used by many people. One may become disappointed of a certain way, but then has to come up with a new thing. Even if people think that the reform movement can not solve their problems, sitting in their homes would not be the alternative solution. Or if they do, it is what they have chosen consciously and should accept its consequences. This disappointment is the same as the impatience mentioned by Shamolvaezin in his talk. Iranians start something and then get disappointed after few years. Then they live under dictatorship for hundred years. They do something again for few years and this loop continues forever. No wonder why we are standing where we are now.

Another wrong assumption which most of the people have is that they think of the current power struggle as a game which they are only the fans while the reformists and conservative are the two teams playing it. As Alavitabar, a reformist, once said, in this game conservatives are playing like a chimpanzee. There is no doubt that when people who have to also play, go aside and watch the game and only once in a while shout, the reformists will lose that game. People should understand the result of this game is firstly linked to their own fate and not only the reformists. I have quite often heard from people that "The reformists haven't done anything. Why should I vote for them?" They say it as if they are doing a favor for the reformists by voting! They are doing a favor for themselves.

It is important to note that the conservatives make their decision based on the pressure they feel by the public opinion. As an example, they used to kill the authors and writers in the past while they send them to jail now. Though they would prefer to kill them even now, they don't simply because of the public opinion. This is why people can play a major role in getting their rights. Sadly, people haven't done much apart from casting a ballot every one or two years, what they even hesitated in the last city council elections. In the last few years, the only active social force was the university students which currently suffer badly from losing their unity.

The fate of the sit-in could have been (and still be) very positive. We tend to neglect the importance of what happened in the last month. In the history of our country, you can rarely see such a resistance against the dictatorship of the power. I think people are to lose another opportunity and will regret for their reluctance later. These two weeks will pass very quickly and quietly. Regardless of the turnout, the conservatives will sweep the parliamentary seats and a year later the presidential one. People patiently endure the dictators again for the coming years. The dictators who are not legitimate by any standard as people who tend to boycott any election wish. I am just wondering how this illegitimacy will make a difference in my life.

It has been hundreds of years that Iran is ruled by dictators, from kings to mullahs. In my opinion, this clearly shows that the problem cannot lie on the ruling dictator, but the people. This reminds me a quote from Imam Ali, the first Shiite religious leader, that the people deserve those who govern them.

The coming year is expected to be a trying year for the Iranian government, in both of elected and non-elected parts. I wanted to document and list some of the most important challenges that the Iranian government shall face in the coming year here. Here is part I.

5. Presidential Elections in the US: Ironically the presidential election in the US might prove to be more important for Iranians, than their own. An election with an outcome that many now find as fixed, but with a very important uncertainty factor: With G. W. Bush as the president, will the neo-conservatives still rule? Or will it be the middle of the way conservatives that take over again. For Iranian conservatives [hardliners, fundamentalists, you name it... ] either case shall be a very important sign: These are the people who can easily ride the waves: either war or diplomacy and they seem to be prepared for both. Projecting a majority in the parliament and the president in their hands, they are expected to show a unified approach to Iranian foreign policy towards the US.

6. Egyptian Visit: During Khatami's rule[?], Iranian foreign policy enjoyed a better relationship with the Arab countries, especially the fiefdoms of the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, and even Jordan. The latest change came when finally, the conservative [that says a lot!] city council in Tehran, decided to change the name of "Khalid Eslambuli" [Assasinator of Sadat, late Egyptian president] street in Tehran to Intifada! [ People in Tehran are already predicting that the name of this street might change to "Jerusalem" in the near future, while people would still go about and call it by its old name Vozara!] Many are contemplating this to be a part of a more general trend in which Iran wants to be considered in league with Arabs when it comes to the peace process in the Middle East. The usual stance up to now, has been that of a lone third voice reiterating the illegetimacy of the Israeli state as a matter of principle. The first big challenge along this path is the expected visit of the Egyptian president Mobarak: A figure subject to the continual ideological damnations in Iran since he came to power. [Apparently the Egyptian side has already postponed it.]

7. Al-Qaede members: What is going to happen to all those al-Qaeda "captives" now being held in Iran, with their estimated number ranging between 300 and 600? The Americans decided to keep all the al-Qaeda prisoners of war from Afghanistan in the Guantanamo Bay prison, in a very secluded manner. That caused international and internal criticism of US in violation of the International law, however apparently the al-Qaeda captives in Iran have failed to find such good attorneys and have simply become a wild card for the Iranian Military to play every now and then. There is also sporadic news of high ranking al-Qaeda officials travelling in Iran, seeming to be causally connected to terror attacks in Iraq.

8. Nuclear Programme and the Iran-EU relationship: Iran's declaration of violation of its promises on its nuclear programme came synchronized with the stabilization of the occupation of Iraq. After a period of internal struggle [which many projected to be pointless, in fact in these matters according to constitution, the leader has the final say] Iran finally accepted to allow for tougher and random inspections of its nuclear facilities, inspections that could possibly cover everywhere in Iran. This time European Union started the aggressive dialogue, which was a sign that, EU despite being soft on human rights issues in Iran, is very concerned about her safety when it comes to nuclear weapons and possible use of them by terrorist groups. It still remains to be seen what actually comes of these inspections and dialogues, an ongoing story for some time...

9. Iraq's situation: Unfortunately for the Iranian government many of the elements that they believed first that would support them, including major Iraqi Shi'e clergy have turned their backs to them. The Iranian influence in Iraq is still very strong, and many fear that this influence can still affect the election results and the new constitution. Many Iraqis are optimistic about how their country is going to be governed in the near future. Some even expect a modern constitution and a free election supervised by the occupation forces. Challenged already on all borders by the American presence in Afgahnistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Persian gulf, the conservatives in Iran would never risk direct actions but their intrigues shall continue for some time.

I should also apologize for the disconnected nature of this post. Half of it is not my fault anyway!

After three weeks of sit-in protest in parliament, more than one hundred of reformist MPs submitted their resignation letter this morning.

"We will not compromise on the basic rights of our nation, that is, the right to freely choose and be chosen.'' Mohsen Mirdamadi, one of the leading reformist MPs said today.

After the letter was read out, all the resigning MPs stood in the center of the chamber to show their determination and solidarity. (View the picture here.)

This post was much longer last night but I thought it would be better to pull out the full story of the sit-in protest for now as the whole crisis has entered a new phase with the mass resignation. Ironically, the resignation has to be accepted by MPs while with about 120 MPs leaving the parliament (from total of 290 MPs) the Majlis might lose its legitimacy to make any decisions. It is too early to analyze the situation, yet it seems that this time both conservatives and reformists are engaged in a real dangerous game.

Any possible change in the apathic mood of society may affect the course of events. Khatami's reaction can be influential as well (at least for the ready-to-resign senior officials in government.) One should not forget, though, the probable outburst of God's will via his earth correspondent, Ayatollah Khamenei!